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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from Corey Munoz's judgment of conviction for possession of more
than three ounces of marijuana.
B. General Course of Proceedings
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on July 5,2005, Detective Pietrzak and another plain clothes
detective were leaving a trailer park driving an S W where they had been looking for Darryl
Marsh who was wanted for a felony probation violation. Preliminary Hearing Transcripti (PH
Tr.) p. 4, In. 1-6, p. 15, in. 20; Tr. pp. 38,39. As the S W exited, Mr. Munoz, who lived in this
trailer park, drove his Geo into the park with his friend Chris as a passenger. Tr. p. 40, in. 10-12;
PH Tr. p. 15, In. 20 Neither detective had inet Mr. Marsh and were utilizing a photograph and
general description, such as height and weight, to identify him. PH Tr. p. 3, In. 12-21. As Mr.
Munoz and Chris drove past the S W , the detectives noted that Chris shared physical
characteristics with Mr. Marsh. Tr. p. 40, in. 12-22, p. 41, In. 17-19; PH Tr. p. 4,1n.l-17. The
detectives tumed around, drove approximately 100 yards out of the trailer park and waited. Tr.
pp. 42, in. 23 to 43, in. 2; PH Tr. p. 4, in. 18-24. Approximately five minutes later, the detectives
observed the Geo exit the trailer park, with a woman driving, Mr. Munoz in the fiont passenger
seat and Chris in the back seat. Tr. p. 43, In. 3-20; PH Tr. p. 4, In. 24 to p. 5, In. 7, p. 6, in. 21 to
p. 7, in. 6.
The detectives called for marked patrol cars to stop the Geo. Tr. p. 43, in. 21-23; PH Tr.

' The transcript of the preliminary hearing was considered by the district court in the
motion to suppress proceedings and is an exhibit in this appeal. R. 89; Tr. p. 5, in. 23 top. 6, in.
7.
1

p. 5, in. 9-1 1. Because the warrant on Mr. Marsh called for a high risk stop, approximately three
marked police vehicles and the unmarked detectives' S W were involved in the stop. Tr. pp 43,
In. 7-1 1; 45, in. 23 to 47, in. 8. Several patrol officers, with weapons drawn, ordered the Geo
occupants out of the vehicle one by one. Tr. pp 45, in. 23 to 47, in. 8. Each occupant was
handcuffed, patted down for weapons and separated. Tr. pp 45, In. 23 to 47, in. 8; p. 48, in. 1416; PH Tr. p. 25. The detectives learned that although Chris was not Mr. Marsh, he had a
misdemeanor arrest warrant and placed him under arrest. Tr. p. 47, in. 9-19; p. 48, In. 17-25.
Detective Pietrzak searched the Geo and discovered a small chunk of marijuana onthe passenger
floorboard. PH Tr. p. 7, in. 17-20. Detective Pietrzak approached Mr. Munoz and inquired
z
ownership. PH Tr. p. 7, in. 17-24,
about the chunk of marijuana, to which Mr. ~ u n h admitted
p. 9, in. 13-16. Detective Pietrzak then asked if Mr. Munoz had any more marijuana and Mr.
Munoz produced a baggie with slightly more than three ounces of marijuana from his pants
.

.

pocket. PH Tr. p. 7, In. 17-24, p. 9, in. 21-25. Mr. Munoz was thereafter charged with felony
possession of marijuana. R. 6-7
Mr. Munoz filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop of the Geo, its subsequent
search and the search of his person were violative of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable Searches and seizures. R. 36-39. Mr. Munoz also contended that he admitted
owning marijuana during a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings and
that therefore his statements should be suppressed. R. 36-39. The district court concluded that
the detective's belief that Chris was Mr. Marsh justified the stop and that the detective noticed
the marijuana in plain view while ensuring no one remained in the Geo. R. 51-52. The district
court also found that Mr. Munoz was not subjected to custodial interrogation and that his act in

removing the marijuana froin his pocket was voluntary. R. 52-53. The district court therefore
denied Mr. Munoz's motion to suppress. R. 53. Mr. Munoz entered a conditional plea of guilty,
reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 62-63. This
timely appeal follows. R. 80-81.

111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Was the detective's belief that Chris was Mr. Marsh unreasonable and the stop of the
Geo therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment?

B. Did the state fail to show that the search of the Geo was justified by an applicable
exception to the warrant requirement?

C. Was Mr. Munoz's admission to possessing the marijuana the product of a custodial
interrogationwithout the benefit of Miranda warnings?
D . Was Mr. Munoz's act of pulling the marijuana out of his pocket involuntary?

IV. ,ARGUMENT

. .

On appeal from the district court's decision on a motion to suppress, this Court defers to
the findings of fact unless they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53,961 P.2d 641,643-44 (1998); State v. Kimball,
141 Idaho 489,491, 111 P.3d 625,627 (Ct. App. 2005). This Court freely reviews the trial
court's determination as to whether, on the facts presented, constitutional standards were
violated. DuValt, 131 Idaho at 552-53,961 P.2d at 643-44; Kimball, 141 Idaho at 491, 111 P.3d
at 627.
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. State

v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835,837-38, 103 P.3d 448,450-51 (2004); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176,

182,90 P.3d 926,932 (Ct. App. 2004). The state may overcome the presulnption of
unreasonableness by demonstrating that the warrantless search fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 838, 103 P.3d at 451; Roe, 140 Idaho
at 182,90 P.3d at 932.
A.

Because the Detective's Belief that Chris was Mr. Marsh was Unreasonable, the stop
of the Geo violated the Fourth Amendment
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a "seizure" of the occupants that implicates the Fourth

Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648,653 (1979); Kimball, 141 Idaho at 491, 111 P.3d at 627. In reviewing whether a traffic
stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment, the court examines the reasonableness of police
conduct against an objective standard and determines whether the facts available to the officer at
.,

..

the moment of the seizure would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the
,.,

action taken was appropriate. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,22 (1968); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho

Although this standard allows room for some mistakes on the part of police officers, any
mistakes must be those of reasonable persons. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949); Kimball, 141 Idaho at 492, 111 P.3d at 628. If subjective good faith alone were the test,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects only in the discretion of the police. Terry, 392 U.S. at
22; Kimball, 141 Idaho at 492-93, 111 P.3d at 628-29. Therefore, subjective good faith on the
part of the officer is not enough and the mistake must be one that would he made by a reasonable
person acting on the facts known to the officer. Kimball, 141 Idaho at 493, 111 P.3d at 629.

While sitting in an S W , Detective Pietrzak momentarily observed Chris in the front
passenger seat of the Geo as the two vehicles passed one another. During this fleeting
observation, the detective testified that he noted a "protruding ear . . configuration," that Mr.
Marsh and Chris purportedly shared, both had brown hair and that height and weight were not
"wildly outside" the information available to the detectives. PH Tr. pp. 13-16. The detective
admitted that he did not see Chris outside of the vehicle. PH Tr. p. 15, in. 9-12.
These facts were insufficient to create a reasonable belief that Chris was Mr. Mars11 and
to justify conducting the high risk traffic stop. Therefore, the district court erred in detennining
that the traffic stop of the Geo was justified and in denying Mr. Munoz's motion to suppress

B.

The State Failed to Demonstrate That the Search of the Geo Was Justified by an
Applicable Exceptio~lto the Warrant Requirement
The district court found that Detective Pietrak found the small chunk of marijuana in

plain view and, regardless, the officers were justified in searching the Geo incident to Chris's
arrest. R. 52. However, because Detective Pietrzak's testimony was inherently contradictory on
key points, that testimony cannot constitute substantial, competent evidence in support of the
district court's findings and was insufficient to meet the state's burden to show that the search
was justified. The detective's contradictory testimony silnilarly cannot support a finding that the
search was properly conducted incident to Chris's and, even if it could, that exception should not
be applied on the facts of this case.
At the preliminary hearing, Detective Pietrzak testified that, after discovering that Chris
had a warrant, he searched the Geo incident to his arrest and found a small chunk of marijuana on
the front passenger side floor board. PH Tr. p. 6, in. 15-19, p. 17, in. 15-20. Defense counsel
questioned Detective Pietrzak as to whether he approached the Geo to ensure no one was inside

and the detective clarified that:
Oh, no, sir. I think you're lumping two events. As far as the
chronological order of it, I'm not going to testify that the - that vehicle wasn't
cleared for the entire time it took to confirm that warrant.
I know that we went up and glanced, made sure there was no one in the
car, nothing hazardous while we conducted our business 30 feet away or a car's
length away from it.
After [Chris] was arrested on the warrant, the vehicle was searched
incident to his arrest.
PI3 Tr. p. 27, ln. 12-16. Defense counsel inquired whether there was any other reason to search
the Geo and Detective Pietrzak responded "at which - the actual physical search of the car, when
I found the marijuana? Yes, that's incident to [Chris's] arrest." PH Tr. p. 28, in. 8-10. As to the
manner in which he discovered the marijuana, the Detective testified that: "I opened the door and
began searching. I looked above the visor, looked on the dashboard. At some point, I looked on
the passenger floor board and then found the marijuana." PH Tr. 22-25.
Conversely, at the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Pietrzak testified that prior to
learning that Cluris had a warrant for his arrest, "we needed to find out to ensure there was only
three people in the vehicle. I walked up and made sure of that visually." Tr. 49, in. 12-16. The
Detective testified that he approached the Geo and, as he stood fiom the street, he noticed a
small chunk of marijuana on the passenger floorboard, in plain view. Tr. p. 50, in. 2-16, p. 62,
In. 8-9. At that time, the officer did not address the marijuana because he believed he had Mr.
Marsh and "obviously" the priority was to begin speaking with him. Tr. p. 50, in. 19-22.
The district court disposed of these discrepancies by noting some "confusion" as to
whether Detective Pietrzak discovered the marijuana while "clearing" the vehicle or while
searching it incident to Chris's arrest. R. 52, n. 1. However, in the preliminary hearing version,
Detective Pietrzak specifically noted discovering the chunk of marijuana after identifying Chris

whereas the reverse is true of Detective Pietrzak's motion to suppress testimony. At the
preliminary hearing, Detective Pietrzak described opening the car door, looking in the visor and
dashboard before discovering the marijuana on the floorboard while at the suppression hearing
described seeing the marijuana without entering the vehicle from where he stood on the street.
These discrepancies cannot be rectified by "confusion."
It is not possible to reconcile Detective Pietrzak's varying versions of events. Therefore,
his testimony cannot constitute substantial, competent evidence to support the district court's
finding that the marijuana was in plain view and was insufficient to overcome the state's burden
of showing that the warrantless search was reasonable.
Moreover, the search of the Geo cannot be justified as a search incident to Chris's arrest.
Initially, contrary to the district court's finding, if Detective Pietrzak discovered the marijuana
prior to confirming there was a warrant for Chris's arrest as he testified to at the suppression
hearing, then the search was not properly conducted incident to Chris's arrest. Additionally, the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement should be limited to cases where it
is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Arizona v. Cant, 128 S.Ct. 1443
(2008) to detennine whether "the Fourth Amendment require[s] law enforcement officers to
demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest in
order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's
recent occupants have been arrested and secured." The historical rationale for the search incident
to arrest doctrine was the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody and the
need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620

(2004). As noted by Justice O'Connor in Thornton, courts treat the ability to search a vehicle
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than an exception
justified by the twin rationales. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (Justice O'Connor, concurring in
part). Justice Scalia indicated he would uphold the search at issue in Thornton because the
defendant was arrested for a dmg offense and, thus, it was reasonable to believe that further
contraband or similar evidence relevant to the crime for which he had been arrested might be
found in the vehicle. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (concurring in judgment joined by Justice
Ginsberg).
Here, Chris was arrested on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant unrelated to the traffic
stop of the Geo. Nothing in the record suggests that the circumstances of Chris's arrest gave rise
to a belief that there was evidence of a crime related to the misdemeanor warrant in the Geo or
any need to disann Chris, as he stood in handcuffs thirty feet away from the vehicle.
Accordingly, the search of the Geo cannot be upheld on the alternate basis as a search incident to
Chris's arrest and the district court erred in denying Mr. Munoz's motion to suppress.

C.

Mr. Munoz' Admission to Possessing the Marijuana Was the Product of a Custodial
Interrogation Without the Benefit of Miranda Warnings
The district court found that Mr. Munoz was not in custody for purposes of Miranda at

the time he was questioned about the marijuana. However, the stop of the Geo was not a routine
traffic stop and, given the police domination at the scene, a reasonable person in Mr. Munoz's
position would have understood his freedom to be restrained to a degee associated with formal
arrest.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that
prior to "custodial interrogation" the police must advise a person of certain rights guaranteed by

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 5 13
and 5 17 of the Idaho Constitution. A person need not be under arrest to be "in custody" for
Miranda purposes. State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364,369,986 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Ct. App.1999).
Short of an actual arrest, "the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest."' Frank, 133
Idaho at 369, 986 P.2d at 1035 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). In
determining whether the person interrogated is "in custody," "a court inust consider all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, with the ultimate inquiry being whether there [was]
a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal
arrest." State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 81 1, 816, 948 P.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App.1997) (quoting California
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). The test is objective, and requires consideration of how
a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand his or her situation. Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 442.
Although routine traffic stops are generally not considered custodial, where coercive
aspects of the traffic stop are such that a reasonable person would believe that his or her freedom
is deprived in a significant way, the encounter becomes custodial for purposes of Miranda. See
State v. Meyers, 118 Idaho 608,610-11,798 P.2d 453,455-56 (Ct. App. 1990). The relatively
temporary and brief nature of a traffic stop mitigates the risk that a person will feel induced to
speak involuntarily. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. Nonetheless, if an officer's questioning or
conduct transforms an investigative detention into a custodial interrogation, the failure to
properly advise a detainee of his or her Miranda protections renders any resulting statements
inadmissible. State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595,600,887 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Ct. App. 1994).

In Meyers, as here, three marked and one unmarked police vehicles were involved during
a traffic stop during which the defendant was asked about drugs. The Court of Appeals
concluded that a reasonable man in the defendant's position could conclude that such excessive
"police domination" deprived hiin of his freedom of movement in a significant way. Meyers,
118 Idaho at 61 1-12,798 P.2d at 456-57. Similarly, approximately ten minutes after being
ordered out of his vehicle at gun point, handcuffed and frisked, the detectives asked Mr. Mnnoz
whether he had any marijuana. Tr. p. 52, in. 6-15; p. 53, in. 5-8. Although the handcuffs had
apparently been taken off at the time the detectives questioned Mr. Munoz about the marijuana,
the scene was still dominated by police and the coercive effects of the manner in which Mr.
Munoz was ordered out of his vehicle undoubtedly lingered.
Under the circumstances present in this case, a person in Mr. Munoz's position would
have understood his liberty to be restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest.
Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding Mr. Munoz was not subjected to custodial
interrogation and in refusing to suppress his statements regarding the marijuana.
D.

Mr. Munoz's Act of Pulling the Marijuana out of His Pocket Was Involuntary
The district court found that Mr. Munoz's act of pulling the marijuana out of his pocket

was voluntary. R. 52. However, as a result of the police domination, absence of Miranda
warnings and other subtly coercive circumstances, Mr. Munoz's consent to the search of his
pocket, by producing the baggie of marijuana at the detective's request, was not the product of
free will.
A search conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is an exception to the
warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973); State v. Rector, 144

Idaho 643,644,167 P.3d 780,781 (Ct. App. 2006). To justify a search by consent, the state
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary ratherthan the
result of direct or implied duress or coercion. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221; Rector, 144 Idaho at
645, 167 P.3d at 782. Courts determine whether consent was the product of coercion in a
particular case by assessing the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226;
Rector, 144 Idaho at 645, 167 P.3d at 782. Thus, whether consent was granted voluntarily
depends on the surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive police questions and
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party granting the consent to a search. State v.
Hunsen, 138 Idaho 791,796,69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); Rector, 144 Idaho at 645, 167 P.3d at
782. Relevant factors in this inquiry include the number of officers involved, the location and
conditions of the consent, whether the individual was free to leave and whether the individual
lmew of his right to refuse consent. Rector, 144 Idaho at 645, 167 P.3d at 782. "Although the
presence of multiple police officers does not, standing alone, establish coercion, and there is no
requirement that police inform the individual that he is free to leave or that he has a right to
refuse consent, these factors are nevertheless relevant when viewing the totality of the
circumstances." Id.
Here, three marked and one unmarked police vehicles were present at the time the
detectives questioned Mr. Munoz about the marijuana. Mr. Munoz was detained and was not
informed of his right to refuse to answer the officers' questions regarding marijuana. Before
being questioned, Mr. Munoz had been ordered out of his vehicle at gunpoint. The overt and
subtle coercive police tactics overbore Mr. Munoz's will and rendered the act of giving the

detectives the marijuana out of his pocket involuntary. Accordingly, the state failed to meet its
burden to show Mr. Munoz's consent was voluntary and the district court erred in denying Mr.
Munoz's motion to suppress.

V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Munoz respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court's order denying his
motion to suppress and vacate his judgment of conviction.
Respectfully submitted this d3';ay
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